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Abstract
We estimate a nite mixture dynamic programming model of schooling deci-
sions in which the log wage regression function is set in a random coe¢ cient
framework. We also analyze the determinants of 3 counterfactual experi-
ments (a college attendance subsidy, a high school graduation subsidy and
an overall decrease in the rate of time preference) and examine a proposition
often claimed in the Average Treatment E¤ects literature; that the dis-
crepancy between OLS and IV estimates of the returns to schooling may be
explained by the relatively higher returns experienced by those a¤ected by ex-
ogenous policy changes. We nd that the average return to experience upon
entering the labor market (0.0863) exceeds the average return to schooling
(0.0576) and we nd more cross-sectional variability in the returns to expe-
rience than in the returns to schooling. Labor market skills (as opposed to
taste for schooling) appear to be the prime factor explaining schooling at-
tainments. We nd little evidence in favor of a positive correlation between
reactions induced by an exogenous experiment and the individual specic
returns to schooling.
Key Words: Random Coe¢ cient, Returns to Schooling, Comparative
Advantages, Dynamic Programming, Dynamic Self-Selection.
JEL Classication: J2-J3.
1 Introduction and Objectives
In this paper, we investigate the empirical properties of the correlated random
coe¢ cient wage regression model (CRCWRM) using a structural dynamic
programming model.1 The term correlated random coe¢ cient wage regres-
sion modelrefers to the standard Mincerian log wage regression function in
which the coe¢ cients may be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors (edu-
cation and experience). While the comparative advantages representation of
the labor market is far from being new (Roy, 1951, Becker and Chiswick, 1966
and Willis and Rosen, 1979), economists have only recently paid particular
attention to the specication and the estimation of linear wage regression
models set in a random coe¢ cient framework (Heckman and Vitlacyl (1998,
2000), Wooldridge (1997, 2000), Angrist and Imbens (1994), Card (2000)
and Meghir and Palme (2001)). In this recent branch of the literature, it is
customary to estimate the log wage regression function using Instrumental
Variable (IV) techniques and interpret the estimates in a framework where
the returns to schooling are individual specic. This surge of new research is
understandable. In a context where schooling is understood as the outcome of
individual decision making within a dynamic framework, rational individuals
base their schooling decisions partly on absolute and comparative advantages
in the labor market and partly on their taste for schooling. As a consequence,
the random coe¢ cients (the returns to schooling and experience), as opposed
to only the individual specic intercept terms, will normally be correlated
with individual schooling attainments.
In a linear wage regression, individual di¤erences in the intercept term
represent a measure of absolute advantage in the labor market while di¤er-
ences in slopes reect individual comparative advantages in human capital
acquisition via schooling and experience. While it might be tempting to focus
solely on heterogeneity in the returns to schooling (and assume homogeneous
returns to experience), this approach is likely to be unsatisfactory. If the re-
turns to schooling and experience are truly correlated, ignoring individual
di¤erences in the return to labor market experience is likely to a¤ect the
estimates of the returns to schooling as well as the causal link between labor
market ability and schooling (dynamic self-selection). Modeling wage regres-
sions in a random coe¢ cient framework therefore requires the allowance for
1The term correlated random coe¢ cient wage regression modelis also used in Heck-
man and Vitlacyl (1998).
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heterogeneity in the returns to experience.2
As it stands, very little is known about the empirical properties of the CR-
CWRM. For instance, those interested in estimating the returns to schooling
by IV techniques usually ignore higher moments such as the variance of the
returns to schooling and experience, or use a reduced-form framework which
cannot disclose the covariances between realized schooling and the individ-
ual specic coe¢ cients. However, these quantities are important. They may
shed light on the importance of comparative advantages in the labor market
and help comprehend the determinants of individual schooling attainments.
Finally, they may help quantify the Ability Bias(OLS bias) arising in es-
timating the returns to schooling using regression techniques. Obviously, a
random coe¢ cient regression model provides a realistic framework to evalu-
ate the relative importance of labor markets skills and taste for schooling in
explaining cross-sectional di¤erences in schooling attainments. Virtually all
recent work on empirical earnings functions is directly or indirectly based on
a random coe¢ cient framework. For this reason, it deserves some attention.3
Our main objective is to investigate the empirical properties of the CR-
CWRM. These include the population average returns to schooling and ex-
perience, the relative dispersions in the returns to schooling and experience,
and the relative importance of labor market skills and individual specic
taste for schooling in explaining cross-sectional di¤erences in schooling at-
tainments. We estimate a nite mixture structural dynamic programming
model of schooling decisions with 8 unknown types of individuals, where
each type is characterized by a specic log wage regression function (linear)
as well as a specic utility of attending school.4 The estimation of a mixed
2Individual di¤erences in the return to experience may be explained by comparative
advantages in on-the-job training, learning on the job, job search or any other type of post-
schooling activities enhancing market wages. Allowing for heterogeneity in the returns to
experience is especially important if individual post-schooling human capital investments
are unobserved (which is the case in most data sets).
3Heterogenity in realized returns to schooling may also arise if the local returns change
with the level to schooling. In a recent paper, Belzil and Hansen (2002a) used a structural
dynamic programming model to obtain exible estimates of the wage regression function
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They found that the log wage
regression is highly convex and found returns to schooling much lower than what is usually
reported in the existing literature although the local returns may uctuate between 1%
(or less) and 13% per year.
4In this paper, we disregard using available measures like AFQT scores. We do so
for two main reasons. First, AFQT scores may often reect di¤erences in schooling (as
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likelihood function has two main advantages. It can capture any arbitrary
correlation between any of the heterogeneity components and it obviates the
need to incorporate all parentsbackground variables in each single hetero-
geneity component or to select, somewhat arbitrarily, which heterogeneity
components are correlated with household background variables and which
ones are not.
A second objective is to illustrate the importance of population hetero-
geneity and, more specically, to analyze the characteristics of the sub-
population (s) most a¤ected by a counterfactual experiment. This is an
important issue. In the literature, estimates of the returns to schooling ob-
tained using instrumental variable techniques are often higher than OLS
estimates.5 It is often postulated that these results are explained by the fact
that those individuals more likely to react to an exogenous policy change
must have higher returns to schooling than average. As far as we know, this
claim has neither been proved nor veried empirically in any direct fashion.
To illustrate the importance of heterogeneity in the reactions to treatment,
we conducted 3 counterfactual experiments. We rst increased the level of
the utility of attending school so to mimic the e¤ect of a college subsidy.
As this experiment is targeted at specic school levels, we also simulated a
decrease in the rate of time preference. This experiment is more likely to
a¤ect school attendance at all levels, although it is perhaps more di¢ cult to
associate an empirical counterpart to it.6 Finally, we simulated a high school
graduation subsidy which, for instance, might be targeted at reducing high
school drop out behavior. In all cases, the experiment represents a truly
exogenouschange which may serve as a basis for a natural experiment.
A third and nal objective is to investigate the notion of Ability Biasin
a context where the notion is much deeper than the usual correlation between
tests are not taken at the same age by all young individuals). Second, and perhaps more
importantly, we are interested in developing a methodology which may be applicable to a
wide range of panel data sets. As far as we know, most panel data sets of labor market
histories do not contain observed measures of skill heterogeneity such as AFQT scores and
the like.
5The validity of very high returns to schooling, reported in a simple regression frame-
work have been seriously questioned (see Manski and Pepper, 2000 and Belzil and Hansen,
2002a). It is also interesting to note that empirical evidence also suggests that standard
wage regressions augmented with observable measures of ability (such as test scores and
the like) lead to a decrease in the estimated returns to schooling.
6In the literature, it is sometimes argued that di¤erences in credit constraints may be
captured in the discount rate (see Cameron and Taber, for a recent example).
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the individual specic intercept terms of the wage regression and realized
schooling attainments. As market ability heterogeneity is multi-dimensional
in our model, our estimate of the Ability Bias (OLS bias) is not only explained
by the correlation between the individual specic intercept term and realized
schooling but also by the simultaneous correlations between schooling and
experience and the individual specic deviations from population average
returns to schooling and experience.
The model is implemented on a panel of white males taken from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The panel covers a period
going from 1979 until 1990. The main results are as follows. We nd pop-
ulation average returns to schooling which are much below those reported
in the existing literature. Our estimates are also much lower than those
obtained using standard OLS techniques. The average return to experi-
ence upon entering the labor market (0.0863) exceeds the average return to
schooling (0.0576) and we nd more cross-sectional variability in the returns
to experience than in the returns to schooling. The returns to schooling and
experience are found to be positively correlated. Not surprisingly, the corre-
lated random coe¢ cient wage regression model ts wage data very well. It
can explain as much as 78.5% of the variation in realized wages. Overall, the
dynamic programming model indicates that labor market skills are the prime
factor explaining schooling attainments as 82% of the explained variation is
indeed explained by individual comparative and absolute advantages in the
labor market and only 18% is explained by individual di¤erences in taste for
schooling. Moreover, realized schooling attainments are more strongly corre-
lated with individual di¤erences in returns to experience than in returns to
schooling.
The importance of individual heterogeneity in the level of reactions to pol-
icy changes is well illustrated by the 3 counterfactual experiments that we
conducted. In all cases (the college attendance subsidy, the high school grad-
uation subsidy and the overall decrease in the rate of time preference), the
reactions induced by the articial instrument are a complicated (non-linear)
function of individual specic skills and, moreover, the determinants of the
reactions will di¤er according to the nature of the experiment. More speci-
cally, it appears that the determinants of the reactions are very much a¤ected
by whether or not the experiment is targeted at a particular school level.
However, homogeneity is strongly rejected. Unlike what is often claimed
in the average treatment e¤ects literature, the discrepancy between IV and
OLS is not necessarily explained by a positive correlation between individual
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specic schooling reactions and the returns to schooling. While it is possible
to reconcile our results with conventional wisdom about IV estimates of the
returns to schooling in one of our experiments (the general decrease in the
discount rate), a positive correlation between individual specic reactions
and the returns to schooling is not a general consequenceof any exogenous
change in the determinant of school attendance.
The paper is structured as follows. The empirical dynamic programming
model is exposed in Section 2. The goodness of t is evaluated in Section
3. A discussion of the estimates of the return to schooling and experience
are found in Section 4. In Section 5, we illustrate the links between labor
market skills and dynamic self-selection. In Section 6, we analyze the deter-
minants of the individual specic reactions to 3 counterfactual experiments
and examine a proposition often claimed in the Average Treatment E¤ects
literature; that the discrepancy between OLS and IV estimates of the returns
to schooling may be explained by the relatively higher returns experienced
by those a¤ected by exogenous policy changes. In Section 7, we discuss
the links between our estimates and those reported in the literature and re-
examine the notion of Ability Bias in a context where the regression function
allows for a rich specication of absolute and comparative advantages. The
conclusion is in Section 8.
2 An Empirical Dynamic ProgrammingModel
of Schooling Decisions with Comparative
Advantages
In this section, we introduce the empirical dynamic programming model.
While the theoretical structure of the problem solved by a specic agent
is similar to the model found in Belzil and Hansen (2002a), the di¤erent
stochastic specication and, especially, the allowance for a rich specication
of absolute and comparative advantages requires a full presentation.
Young individuals decide sequentially whether it is optimal or not to
enter the labor market or continue accumulate human capital. Individuals
maximize discounted expected lifetime utility over a nite horizon T and
have identical preferences. Both the instantaneous utility of being in school
and the utility of work are logarithmic. The control variable, dit; summarizes
the stopping rule. When dit = 1; an individual invests in an additional year
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of schooling at the beginning of period t. When dit = 0, an individual
leaves school at the beginning of period t (to enter the labor market). Every
decision is made at the beginning the period and the amount of schooling
acquired by the beginning of date t is denoted Sit:
2.1 The Utility of Attending School
The instantaneous utility of attending school, U s(:); is formulated as the
following equation7
U s(:) =  (Sit) + 

i + "

it (1)
in which "it  i:i:d N(0; 2) represents a stochastic utility shock, the term i
represents individual heterogeneity (ability) a¤ecting the utility of attending
school and  (:) captures the co-movement between the utility of attending
school and grade level.
We assume that individuals interrupt schooling with exogenous probabil-
ity  and, as a consequence, the possibility to take a decision depends on
a state variable Iit:8 When Iit = 1; the decision problem is frozen for one
period. If Iit = 0; the decision can be made. When an interruption occurs,
the stock of human capital remains constant over the period.9
2.2 The Utility of Work
Once the individual has entered the labor market, he receives monetary in-
come ~wt; which is the product of the yearly employment rate, et; and the
wage rate, wt: The instantaneous utility of work, Uw(:)
Uw(:) = log( ~wt) = log(et  wt)
7The utiliy of school could be interpreted as the monetary equivalent (on a per hour
basis) of attending school.
8The interruption state is meant to capture events such as illness, injury, travel, tem-
porary work, incarceration or academic failure.
9The NLSY does not contain data on parental transfers and, in particular, does not
allow a distinction in income received according to the interruption status. As a con-
sequence, we ignore the distinction between income support while in school and income
support when school is interrupted. In the NLSY, we nd that more than 85% of the
sample has never experienced school interruption.
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2.3 The Correlated Random Coe¢ cient Wage Regres-
sion Model
The log wage received by individual i, at time t, is given by
logwit = '1i  Sit + i  ('2  Experit + '3  Exper2it) + wi + "wit (2)
where '1i is the individual specic wage return to schooling and i is an
individual specic factor multiplying the e¤ect of experience ('2) and the
e¤ect of experience squared ('3). The term 
w
i represents an individual
specic intercept term. We assume that
'1i = '1 + !1i
i = + !2i
where '1 and  represent population averages. Following the convention
used in the literature, it is convenient to specify the wage regression as a
heteroskedastic regression function
logwit = '1  Sit + '2:  Experit + '3:  Exper2it + %it (3)
where
'2 =   '2
'3 =   '3
%it = 
w
i + !1i  Sit + !2i  ('2  Experit + '3:  Exper2it) + "wit
Estimating the population average returns to schooling and experience
('1, '

2 and '

3 ) is rendered di¢ cult by the fact that typically
Corr( %it; Sit) 6= 0
Corr( %it; Experit) 6= 0
7
2.4 The Employment Rate
The employment rate, eit; is also allowed to depend on accumulated human
capital (Sit and Experit) so that
ln eit = ln
1
eit
= ei + 1  Sit + 2  Experit + 3  Exper2it + "eit (4)
where ei is an individual specic intercept term, 1 represents the employ-
ment security return to schooling, both 2 and 3 represent the employment
security return to experience.10 The random shock "eit is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 2e: All random shocks ("

it; "
w
it; "
e
it) are assumed to
be independent.
2.5 The Value Functions
We only model the decision to acquire schooling beyond 6 years (as virtually
every individual in the sample has completed at least six years of schooling).
We set T to 65 years and the maximum number of years of schooling to
22. Dropping the individual subscript, the value function associated with
the decision to remain in school, given accumulated schooling St , denoted
V st (St; t); can be expressed as
V st (St; t) = ln(t) + f  EV It+1(St+1; t+1) (5)
+(1  )  EMax[V st+1(St+1; t+1); V wt+1(St+1; t+1)]g
where V It+1(St+1; t+1) denotes the value of interrupting schooling acquisition.
Since we cannot distinguish between income support while in school and
income support when school is interrupted, the value of interrupting schooling
acquisition is identical to the value of attending school. V It+1(St+1; t+1); can
be expressed as follows.
V It+1(St+1; t+1) = log(t+1) + f  EV It+2(St+2; t+2)
+(1  )  EMax[V st+2(St+2; t+2); V wt+2(St+2; t+2)]g (6)
10It follows that the expected value and the variance of the employment rate are given
by Eet =   exp(t + 122e) and V ar(et) = exp(2t + 2e)  (exp(2e)  1).
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The value of stopping school (that is entering the labor market), V wt (St; t),
is given by
V wt (St; t) = ln(wit  eit) + E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) (7)
where E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) is simply
E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) =
TX
j=t+1
j (t+1)(  exp(j+
1
2
2e)+'1(Sj)+['2:Experj+'3:Exper2j ])
is simply the expected utility of working from t+1 until T . Using the terminal
value and the distributional assumptions about the stochastic shocks, the
probability of choosing a particular sequence of discrete choices can readily
be expressed in closed form.
2.6 Unobserved Ability in School and in the Labor
Market
We assume that there are K types of individuals. Each type (k) is endowed
with a vector (k; 
w
k ; 
e
k; '1k; k) for k = 1; 2:::K . The results reported in
this paper are for the case K = 8. The probability of belonging to type k;
pk; is estimated using logistic transform
pk =
exp(qk)P8
j=1 exp(qj)
and with the restriction that q8 = 0.11
2.7 Identication
As it is the case in all empirical dynamic programming models, identication
of the key components of the model will require distributional assumption.
11As discussed in Belzil and Hansen (2002a), identication of most parameters is rela-
tively straightforward. However, in order to reduce the degree of under-identication (non-
parametric), we xed the discount rate to 3% per year (an estimate practically identical
to the estimate found in Belzil and Hansen (2002a). The degree of under-identication
arising in estimating structural dynamic programming models is discussed in details in
Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2001).
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Our model being structured as a single choice dynamic model, data on both
wages and schooling attainments allow us to identify the key parameters
the utility of attending school (like in Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein
and Wolpin, 1999 and Belzil and Hansen (2002a). Identication of the wage
return to schooling, the employment return to schooling and unobserved
market ability is relatively straightforward given panel data on labor market
wages and employment rates given a distributional assumption about the
stochastic shock. In the present case, where the wage regression function
may be expressed as a heteroskedastic regression function, identication of
the individual specic slopes is facilitated by assuming homoskedasticity of
the stochastic shocks. However, in order to reduce the degree of under-
identication (non-parametric), we xed the discount rate to 3% per year
(an estimate practically identical to the estimate found in Belzil and Hansen
(2002a).12
2.8 The Likelihood Function
Constructing the likelihood function (for a given type k) is relatively straight-
forward. It has three components; the probability of having spent at most
 years in school (L1k), the probability of entering the labor market in year
+1; at observed wage w+1 (denoted L2k) and the density of observed wages
and employment rates from  +2 until 1990 (denoted L3k): L1k can easily be
evaluated using (5) and (6), while L2k can be factored as the product of a
normal conditional probability times the marginal wage density. Finally L3k
is just the product of wage densities and employment densities. For a given
type k, the likelihood is therefore Lk = L1k  L2k  L3k and the log likelihood
function to be maximized is
logL = log
8X
k=1
pk  Lk (8)
where each pk represents the population proportion of type k.
12The degree of under-identication arising in estimating structural dynamic program-
ming models is discussed in details in Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2001).
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3 Accuracy of Predicted Schooling and Pre-
dicted Wages
Evidence presented in Table 1A shows clearly that the model is capable
of tting the data quite well. A comparison between actual and predicted
frequencies reveals that, except for the very low levels of schooling, our model
predicts a pattern which is practically identical to the one found in the data.
In particular, we are able to predict the large frequencies at 12 years and 16
years. The t is comparable to what is found in Belzil and Hansen (2001a
and 2001b), in which data on household background (parentseducation and
income, number of siblings and the like) are used explicitly in the utility of
attending school as well as in the wage regression.
Using the structural estimates, it is easy to compute a type specic ex-
pected schooling attainments. These are reported in Table 1B. The type
specic attainments range from 9.4 years (type 4) to 13.7 years (type 3).
An in-depth analysis of the links between schooling and individual specic
absolute and comparative advantages is delayed to Section 5.
It is also straightforward to use the simulated values of schooling and
experience to simulate series of realized lifetime wages. These series can be
used to infer the fraction of the variance of realized wages which is explained
by the individual specic regression functions. To investigate the goodness of
t, we have simulated wages for a cohort of individuals aged 30 in 199013. The
results reported in Table 1C indicate that random coe¢ cient model explains
78.9% of the observed (realized) variation in wages. This is much larger than
what is usually reported in the literature, in which standard OLS regressions
of wages on schooling and experience typically result in values of R2 ranging
between 0.20 and 0.25 (see Card, 2000).
4 Absolute and Comparative Advantages in
the Labor Market: Some Estimates
In this section, we discuss of the estimates of the return to schooling and
experience. The model has been t on a sample of white males taken from the
NLSY and we used the exact same sample as in Belzil and Hansen (2002a).
13We have also simulated wages under various other scenarios and obtained similar
results.
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More details are found in Appendix. Note that the estimation of a nite
mixture dynamic programming model not only allows us to estimate the
population average returns to schooling and experience but also the cross-
sectional variability in the returns. This is a relatively novel feature. As far
as we know, no one has ever been able to obtain estimates of the variances
of the returns to schooling and experience in a framework where both are
endogenous.14
The individual specic estimates of the wage regression function (the
returns to schooling and experience as well as the individual specic intercept
terms measuring absolute advantages in the labor market) are found in Table
2A. Our estimates of the returns to schooling range from 0.0265 (type 7) to
0.0879 (type 2) while our estimates of the individual specic 0s (ranging
from 0.1453 to 1.0866) imply that the returns to experience upon entrance
in the labor market range from 0.0197 (type 6) to 0.1477 (type 5). Given
the estimates for '2 (0.1359) and '3 (-0.0040), the ordering based on the 
0s
is identical to the ordering based on the product of  and '2 for the most
part of the life cycle and, especially, for the early post-schooling period. As
an illustration, the individual specic returns to experience measured after
8 years of experience (a level higher than the average level of experience
measured in 1990) are 0.0719 (type 1), 0.0222 (type 2), 0.0141 (type 3),
0.0191 (type 4), 0.0781 (type 5), 0.0105 (type 6), 0.0690 (type 7) and 0.0246
(type 8).
Overall, and as reported in Belzil and Hansen (2002a), our estimates of
the return to schooling are much lower than those reported in the existing
literature.15 The population average return to schooling (0.0575) is smaller
than the population average return to experience upon entrance in the labor
market (0.0863). Interestingly, the high degree of dispersion in  implies a
higher standard deviation in the returns to experience (0.0527) than in the
returns to education (0.0218). Upon reviewing the estimated 0s and the '01s;
it is also noticeable, although not surprising, that the returns to schooling
and experience are positively correlated. The correlation between '1i and i
14Very often, those who focus on the return to schooling use a proxy variable for experi-
ence. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) present a critical analysis of empirical work devoted
to the estimation of the returns to schooling, which ignores post-schooling human capital
investment.
15However, in Belzil and Hansen (2002a), the wage regression function is estimated
exibly using spline techniques. There are 8 di¤erent local returns which range 0.4% per
year to 12.0% per year.
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is around 0.11 and is discussed in more details below (Section 6). It may be
explained by the fact that labor market skills which enhance wage growth
(job training, job search, etc..) are positively correlated with academic skills
which are rewarded in the labor market. This result has clear impact for
the nature of dynamic self-selection. Those endowed with high returns to
education will not necessarily obtain a high level of schooling because they
will be facing a higher opportunity cost of attending school.
While it is di¢ cult to evaluate the relative degree of heterogeneity in taste
for schooling and in the returns to human capital without performing simula-
tions, it is nevertheless informative to examine the estimates of the intercept
terms of the utility of attending school (reported in Table 2B). Clearly, in-
dividual di¤erences in the intercept terms of the taste for schooling appear
as important as di¤erences in the intercept terms of the wage equation. The
intercept terms for the utility of attending school range from -1.7791 (type
2) to -0.6397 (type 7). Interestingly, even after allowing for 8 types, the high
degree of variability (as well as the signicance level) of the spline estimates
shows that the utility of attending school undoubtedly varies with school
level.
Table 3 summarizes the type specic rankings according to all hetero-
geneity dimensions as well as the level of expected schooling. In an empirical
model characterized by a rich specication for skill heterogeneity, the self-
selection process is intricate. Individuals take optimal schooling decisions
based on their individual specic taste for schooling and their absolute and
comparative advantages in the labor market. While some individuals are
endowed with a high taste for schooling (as can be seen from Table 2B),
schooling decisions are largely a¤ected by the combination of comparative
advantages (returns to schooling and experience) and absolute advantages
(intercept terms of the wage regression). As a consequence, it will be impos-
sible to associate a denite set of attributes (say, high or low return to human
capital) to each specic type on the basis of their sole expected schooling at-
tainments. Nevertheless, our model is su¢ ciently rich to capture di¤erences
in comparative advantages among types of individuals that might obtain
similar levels of schooling.
To illustrate this, consider the set of individuals (type 1, type 2, type 4
and type 7) who are predicted to obtain a relatively lower level of schooling
than the rest of the population. Type 7 individuals obtain a low level of
schooling because they have a low return to schooling and a high return to
experience, despite a very high taste for schooling. At the same time, type 2
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individuals, who also obtain a low level of schooling, are endowed with high
return to schooling and experience. However, these individuals are endowed
with a very high wage intercept (high market ability) and a low utility of
attending school.
The mechanics of the model can also be illustrated at the higher end of
the schooling spectrum. Both type 3 and type 8 individuals are predicted
to attain a high level of schooling (13.7 years and 12.6 respectively). While
both types face relatively similar returns to schooling and experience, they
di¤er substantially in terms of the utility of attending school and the wage
intercept. Basically, type 8 individuals choose a high level of schooling be-
cause they have a high utility of attending school and type 3 individuals
choose a high level of schooling because of a very low level of market abil-
ity (wage intercept). A more formal analysis of the link between individual
specic heterogeneity (comparative advantages) and schooling attainments
is performed in the next section.
At this stage, it is informative to examine the estimated correlations be-
tween the returns to schooling and other heterogeneity components (taste for
schooling, returns to experience and wage intercept). In a standard regres-
sion framework where market skill heterogeneity is only intercept based, a
positive Ability Bias is easily explained. It arises because the wage intercept
term is simultaneously (and positively) correlated with taste for schooling
and schooling attainments. However, in the model analyzed therein, self-
selection is more complex. The correlation patterns displayed in Table 4
indicate that those who have a high return to schooling also tend to have
a high return to experience although the measured correlation (0.1030) is
relatively weak. The correlation between the wage intercept and the returns
to schooling is also positive (0.2553). This positive correlation indicates that
those who tend to have higher wages will also tend to have comparative
advantages in schooling and therefore conforms to standard intuition. In-
terestingly, taste for schooling is found to be positively correlated with the
returns to experience (0.2882) but not with the returns to schooling. The
link between these correlations and the treatment e¤ects of an increase in
the utility of attending school will be discussed later.
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5 Explaining Individual Schooling Attain-
ments: Absolute and Comparative Advan-
tages in the LaborMarket vs Taste for School-
ing
To investigate formally the determinants of individual schooling attainments
implied by our estimates, we simulated our model and generated 200,000
observations on schooling attainments. Using standard regression techniques,
we estimated the e¤ects of each individual specic components (taste for
schooling, wage intercept, return to schooling and return to experience) on
schooling attainments. As the exact form of the relationship between realized
schooling and the determinants of the model is unknown, we searched for the
best specication. We started by including all elements and their squared
terms, and gradually removed all those that were found insignicant. We
also experimented with log schooling as well as schooling. The resulting
regressions are found in Table 5A. To get a better picture of the correlation
between schooling and the returns implied by the model, we have plot the
returns (average) against each possible schooling levels (Table 5B).
As expected, individual schooling attainments increase with individual
specic returns to schooling and taste for schooling but decrease with respect
to the wage intercept and the return to experience. In total, individual
di¤erences in labor market skills and taste for schooling explain 35% of the
total cross-sectional variation in schooling. The remaining 65% is explained
by pure random wage and utility shocks. When taste for schooling is excluded
from the regression (column 2), labor market skills explain 28% of the total
variation in schooling attainments. This is interesting. It means that 82%
of the explained variations in schooling attainments are explained by labor
market skill endowments and only 18% by individual di¤erences in taste for
schooling.
While this does not necessarily contradict results recently reported in the
literature, it nevertheless o¤ers a di¤erent way of characterizing schooling
attainments. For instance, Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999) and Belzil and Hansen (2002a and 2002b) all nd that individual
schooling attainments are largely explained by di¤erences in individual taste
for schooling. These di¤erences are either caused by individual abilities or
household human capital. However, in all of these papers, individual di¤er-
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ences in labor market skills are captured in the intercept term of the wage
function. The large e¤ects attributed to di¤erences in the utility of attending
school may therefore be explained by the restricted level of heterogeneity in
labor market skills.16
6 Skill Heterogeneity and Treatment E¤ects:
An Analysis of 3 counterfactual Experiments
The importance of type specic endowments can also be used to learn about
the individual specic reactions to some exogenous policy change. In prac-
tice, any natural experimentcreating changes in the incentives to attend
school must e¤ect at least one of the basic components of the decision mak-
ing. Therefore, the e¤ect of any exogenous policy change will depend on the
fundamental parameters (k, '1k ,
w
k , k and  ).
In the literature concerned with standard linear IV estimation, it is im-
plicitly assumed that the induced response is linear in the instrument and
that unobserved heterogeneity does not a¤ect treatment. Any departure from
these assumptions may have severe consequences. Indeed, the weakness of
the IV approach is widely recognized in the treatment e¤ect literature (Card,
2001 and Heckman and Vitlacyl, 1998). As of now, obtaining consistent es-
timates of the population average parameters, in a heterogenous treatment
e¤ect framework, is still a major challenge.17 Those interested in estimating
average treatment e¤ects using standard IV techniques, often claim that their
estimates (which are only valid for a sub-population) are higher than OLS
estimates simply because the average returns of the sub-population a¤ected
by the instrument are higher than the population average returns (Card,
2000). As far as we know, neither the veracity nor the universality of this
claim have been proved nor veried empirically. At this stage, we may only
conjecture that the patterns of individual specic treatment reactions are
16However, in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the return to schooling varies across broadly
dened occupation types. In Belzil and Hansen (2002b), both the utility of attending
school and labor market ability are function of household background variables. The au-
thors decompose schooling attainments into 2 orthogonal sources, parentshuman capital
and residual school and market abilities. They nd that parentshuman capital variables
are more important than residual ability.
17See Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2002).
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likely to change with the nature of the experiment.18
To illustrate the importance of heterogeneity, we actually conducted 3
counterfactual experiments. We rst increased the level of the utility of at-
tending school so to mimic the e¤ect of a college subsidy. We chose a level
of subsidy corresponding to an average of 25% of the per-period utility of
attending school so to allow for meaningful changes in schooling.19 As our
objective is only to investigate the level of heterogeneity in the response to
treatment, as opposed to obtain a realistic estimate of a college subsidy, the
level of the experiment is immaterial. As this experiment is targeted at spe-
cic school levels, we also simulated a decrease in the rate of time preference
(from 0.05 to 0.04). This experiment may be more likely to a¤ect school
attendance at all levels, although it is perhaps more di¢ cult to associate an
empirical counterpart to it.20 Finally, we simulated a high school graduation
subsidy which, for instance, might be targeted at reducing high school drop
out behavior. Nevertheless, in both cases, the experiment represents a truly
exogenouschange which may serve as a basis for a natural experiment.21
6.1 Treatment E¤ects of a Counterfactual College At-
tendance Subsidy
The type specic changes in mean schooling following the college attendance
subsidy are found in Table 6A. In order to ease the interpretation, we also
included the type specic mean schooling attainments (from Table 1B) and
the returns to schooling (from Table 2A). The results point out to a sub-
stantial level of heterogeneity in the reactions to treatment. The average
increase is around 2.7 years and the standard deviation is around 2.2. This
relatively high average level of reaction is a consequence of the high level of
subsidy which we chose. It is informative to examine the mean schooling
18Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss a similar argument using a simple theoretical
model of the probability of continuing in high school (the Angrist-Krueger model).
19This subsidy boils down to increase the utility by 0.15.
20In the literature, it is sometimes argued that di¤erences in credit constraints may be
captured in the discount rate (see Cameron and Taber, for a recent example).
21As our model is set in a partial equilibrium framework, this simulations ignore the
potential general equilibrium e¤ects of this policy change and may well exaggerate the
e¤ects of treatment. However, as our objective is to examine how various types react to
an identical change, the relative reactions are most likely una¤ected by the magnitude of
the treatment.
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attainments and the returns to schooling of those types that are reacting the
most to treatment. Our nding indicate that the levels of reaction of type
8, type 5 and type 2 individuals are well above the population average. In
particular, type 8 individuals (the most a¤ected group) turns out to be com-
posed of individuals who are just at the margin of deciding to enter post high
school education (12.6 years on average).22 Interestingly, type 8 individuals
are not endowed with a particularly high returns to schooling. Indeed, their
return (0.0400) is even below the population average.
To investigate the determinants of the individual specic reactions and, in
particular, the role of the returns to schooling and experience, we computed
OLS regressions of the change in schooling on all measures of skill hetero-
geneity. The specication allows for potential non-linearities of the e¤ects
of the returns to schooling and experience. The regressions are in Table 6D
(columns 1 and 2). The results reported in column 1 (when all heterogeneity
components are included) illustrate clearly that the e¤ectiveness of a college
subsidy will vary across types. The counterfactual change in years of school-
ing decrease with the instantaneous utility of attending school (k); with the
level of the wage intercept (wk ) and with the individual specic returns to
schooling ('1k) but increase and the returns to experience (k) over the rel-
evant range as the 0s vary between 0.20 and 1.08. Obviously, as indicated
by the standard errors and the level of R2; a test for the nullity of all slope
parameters (a test for homogeneity of treatment reaction) would be strongly
rejected at any reasonable condence level.
However, it should be noted that the estimates of Table 6D must be in-
terpreted as the marginal e¤ects of each particular heterogeneity component
holding other components constant and, as such, are not indicative of the
unconditional correlation between the returns to schooling and the individ-
ual specic reactions to a policy change. Indeed, the results found in column
2 indicate a negative correlation between treatment reaction and the returns
to schooling even if we allow for non-linearities (the estimates are -0.0290
and -0.0070). This result does not support the hypothesis that the returns
to schooling of those who are more likely to react to an exogenous change in
the utility of attending school are overwhelmingly superior to the population
average. On the contrary, the returns should be lower.
22Overall, there is a negative correlation between schooling and treatment reaction (-
0.43)
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6.2 Treatment E¤ects of an Exogenous Decrease in the
Discount Rate
As argued before, a counterfactual decrease in the discount rate (from 0.05
to 0.04) will, by construction, not be targeted at a specic school level (say
college attendance). For this reason, it may be argued that reaction to treat-
ment is less likely to vary across types and more likely to obey the linearity
assumption. We can now examine this claim. First, it may be noted from
Table 3C that treatment reaction rankings have changed in a non-trivial way.
For instance, type 5 individuals are now those who are reacting the most to
this counterfactual experiment and they are also endowed with much higher
returns to schooling (0.0764) than the population average. As well, the re-
gression found in columns 3 of Table 6D indicates that the signs of most
of the parameters associated to the determinant of treatment have changed.
That is the reaction to treatment increases with the instantaneous utility of
attending school (k) and with the individual specic returns to schooling
('1k) but decreases with the level of the wage intercept (
w
k ) and the returns
to experience (k) over the relevant range. However, as in the college atten-
dance subsidy, homogeneity of treatment reaction across types is still strongly
rejected although the lower value of R2 indicate that the heterogeneity level
is somewhat less important.
In this experiment, those reacting the most (type 5) appear to have high
returns to education so there is hope that the results are compatible with
usual claim found in the literature (Card, 2000). Indeed, we nd that the
correlation between the returns to schooling and the reactions to treatment
is U shaped when non-linearities are considered. In particular, the parame-
ters found in column 4 (-0.44 and 0.04) indicate that at levels of the returns
to education above 5.5% per year (virtually the population average return),
the positive term will dominate and standard IV estimates will be likely to
exceed the population average. In this particular experiment, it is therefore
possible to reconcile, at least partially, our results with the common expla-
nation advanced for the incidence of very high IV estimates of the returns to
schooling.
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6.3 Treatment E¤ects of a High School Graduation
Subsidy
As a nal experiment, we simulated the e¤ects of a 25% increase in the per-
period utility of graduating in high school (grade 12). As an example, such
an increase could follow from a high school graduation subsidy targeted at
reducing the number of high school drop-outs. As in all previous experiments,
we present the type specic changes in mean schooling following the high
school graduation subsidy (Table 6C) as well as the determinants of the
individual specic treatment reactions (table 6D, columns 5 and 6).
From Table 6C, it may be inferred that type 8 and type 5 individuals are
those who will react the most to this policy. Overall, there is a strong resem-
blance between the high school graduation subsidy and the college attendance
subsidy. While type 5 is composed of high-school drop outs just at the mar-
gin of deciding to continue until graduation (their expected level of schooling
is 11.5), those types endowed with particularly low level of schooling (type
4 and type 2) do not seem particularly a¤ected by this counterfactual pol-
icy. It is also interesting to note that the unconditional relationship between
treatment reactions and the returns to schooling has now an inverse U-shape
(Table 6D, column 6). Given the parameter values (0.4069 and -0.0496),
the negative correlation will however dominate over the range of returns to
schooling which exceeds 4% per year. As in the college attendance subsidy,
the results of the high school graduation subsidy experiment would not really
support the hypothesis that the returns to schooling of those who are more
likely to react to are overwhelmingly superior to the population average.
At this stage, it is possible to draw the following 2 conclusions. First, and
on a general note, the reactions to policy changes are a complicated non-linear
function of individual specic attributes. It would be therefore somewhat
unnatural to model treatment in a simple linear regression framework unless
there is compelling evidence. As pointed out by Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(2000), the access to data characterized by a natural experimentwill not
obviate the need to model individual specic reactions to treatment. This is
exactly what our estimates and simulations indicate.
Second, and more specically, a positive correlation between returns to
schooling and the individual specic changes in schooling resulting from a
policy experiment is far from a universalconsequence from any exogenous
change in the determinants of school attendance. For instance, we nd no
evidence that IV estimates of the returns to schooling arising from the use of
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an exogenous subsidy to college attendance as an instrument should lead to
particular high returns to schooling (compared to the population average).
To the contrary, they should be lower. A practically similar conclusion may
be drawn from a high school graduation subsidy.
7 The Correlated Random Coe¢ cient Wage
Regression Model and the Ability Bias
In the existing literature, it is customary to investigate the ability bias indi-
rectly by comparing OLS and IV estimates of the return to schooling. Here,
the orthogonality of the cross-sectional error term in the CRCWRM may
be investigated directly using simulations. Furthermore, in a context where
market ability heterogeneity is multi-dimensional, the notion of ability bias is
much deeper than the usual correlation between individual specic intercept
terms of the wage regression and realized schooling attainments. Clearly, the
asymptotic OLS bias may be expressed as
As: bias = plim(^ols   ) = plim(
W 0W
N
) 1  plimW
0
N
where
  = ('1; '2:; '3)0
 W = [St; Expert; Exper2t ]
 N=sample size
 % = w + !01  St + !02  ('2  Expert + '3:  Exper2t ) + "wt .
Note that W is a Nx3 matrix of endogenous variables measured at t and
that the terms St; Expert; Exper2t ; %; !1; !2; 
w are all Nx1 vectors. Obvi-
ously, the asymptotic bias will only be equal to 0 if plimW
0
N
=0. Furthermore,
given that the vector of individual specic error terms  is not centered at 0
and that W 0W is not, in general, a diagonal matrix, it is impossible to ex-
press the asymptotic bias in terms of a simple correlation (as in Card, 2000).
The components of the vector plimW
0
N
as well as the resulting bias may easily
be computed using the sample created in Section 5. The estimates (along
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with their p-values) are found in Table 7A. In Table 7B, we also report the
correlation matrix of W:
There is clear evidence that accumulated human capitalW is not orthog-
onal to the error term  (Table 7A) and that the degree of non-orthogonality
between the vectors ofW is important (Table 7B).23 The product of the prob-
ability limit of the inverse of the moment matrix and the probability limit
of W
0
N
imply that OLS estimates will over-estimate the return to education
and the e¤ect of experience2 and under-estimate the returns to experience.
This may be veried easily by estimating the wage regression by OLS us-
ing various cross-sections of the NLSY or applying OLS on the entire panel.
Obviously, the OLS estimates for education, experience and experience2 will
uctuate according to the specic cross-section (year) chosen. To summarize,
for the largest cross-sections in the NLSY (88, 89 and 90), the OLS estimate
for education will typically uctuate between 8.5% and 10% per year while
the returns to experience will be between 3% and 6% per year.
This illustrates another possible explanation for the di¢ culties encoun-
tered by those interested in estimating these parameters by IV. In absence
of data on entry wages, estimates based on regressions that ignore the endo-
geneity of accumulated experience may su¤er serious mis-specication.
8 Conclusion
We have investigated some of the most interesting properties of the corre-
lated random coe¢ cient wage regression model using a structural dynamic
programming model. In our model, individuals make schooling decisions
according to their individual specic taste for schooling as well as their indi-
vidual specic labor market skills and heterogeneity in the realized returns
to schooling is interpreted as pure cross-sectional heterogeneity.
We nd that the average return to experience upon entrance in the labor
market (0.0863) exceeds the average return to schooling (0.0576) and we nd
more variability in the returns to experience than in the returns to schooling.
The returns to schooling and experience are found to be positively correlated.
Not surprisingly, the correlated random coe¢ cient wage regression model ts
23Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss the non-orthogonality between accumulated
experience and ability which may arise when individuals keep optimizing (by choosing the
optimal number of hours of work) after having entered the labor market.
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wage data very well. It can explain as much as 78.5% of the variation in
realized wages.
Interestingly, labor market skills appear to be the prime factor explaining
schooling attainments as 82% of the explained variations are indeed explained
by individual comparative and absolute advantages in the labor market while
18% only are explained by di¤erences in taste for schooling. Moreover, re-
alized schooling attainments are more strongly correlated with individual
di¤erences in returns to experience than in returns to schooling.
Our results indicate that the reactions to counterfactual policy changes
di¤er substantially across types and that, as a consequence, the usage of
natural experiments will not obviate the need for modeling reaction to treat-
ment. Furthermore, the characterization of the individual specic reactions
di¤er substantially according to the nature of the experiment. For instance, a
college attendance subsidy and a experiment which would result in a decrease
in the discount rate would have very di¤erent consequences, although in both
cases, homogeneity of the reaction is rejected. However, as indicated by our
results, a positive correlation between returns to schooling and reactions to
treatment is not a universalconsequence from any exogenous change in the
determinants of school attendance. For instance, we nd no evidence that IV
estimates of the returns to schooling using a subsidy to college attendance (or
a high school graduation subsidy) as an instrument should lead to particular
high returns to schooling (compared to the population average).
Finally, the evidence presented in this paper is in accordance with the
results presented in Belzil and Hansen (2002a). Although, in the current
paper, heterogeneity in the returns to schooling are interpreted as purely
cross-sectional and the returns do not change with schooling level, our esti-
mates are still much smaller than those reported in the literature. Altogether,
the results reported therein, along with those reported in a companion paper,
point out to the complexities involved in estimating the returns to schooling.
The wage regression function is perhaps a highly non-linear (convex) func-
tion and the degree of convexity most likely depends on individual specic
comparative advantages. At this stage, it is impossible to say whether skill
heterogeneity is more important than non-linearities. Only further work will
clarify this rather fundamental issue.
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Table 1A
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Schooling Attainments
Grade Level Predicted (%) Actual (%)
Grade 6 0.0% 0.3 %
Grade 7 1.4% 0.6%
Grade 8 3.4% 2.9%
Grade 9 5.4% 4.7%
Grade10 6.2% 6.0 %
Grade11 7.5% 7.5 %
Grade12 38.4% 39.6 %
Grade13 7.5% 7.0 %
Grade14 5.7% 7.7 %
Grade15 2.7% 2.9 %
Grade16 12.5% 12.9 %
Grade17 2.2% 2.5 %
Grade18 2.7% 2.4%
Grade19 2.0% 1.3%
Grade 20+ 1.1% 1.6%
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Table 1B
Mean Schooling and Type Probabilities
Expected Type qk
Schooling Probabilities (pk) (st. error)
type 1 10.81 years 0.1375 -0.0122 (0.0895)
type 2 10.43 years 0.0607 -0.8299 (0.0243)
type 3 13.69 years 0.0951 -0.3808 (0.0314)
type 4 9.41 years 0.0725 -0.6519 (0.0371)
type 5 11.51 years 0.1630 0.1579 (0.0577)
type 6 10.86 years 0.1260 -0.0992 (0.0584)
type 7 10.57 years 0.2059 0.3916 (0.0760)
type 8 12.56 years 0.1392 0.0000 (normalized)
Note: The type probabilities are computed using a logistic transforms;
pk =
exp(qk)P8
j=1 exp(qj)
Table 1C
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Wages
Variance of log 0.9597
predicted wages
variance of log 1.2164
realized wages
Explained Variance (%) 78.9%
Note: Log wages are generated under the assumption that all individuals
are aged 30.
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Table 2A
Absolute and Comparative Advantages in the Labor Market
Parameter (st. error)
Wages Employment
Type Inter. Educ. Experience Inter.
wi '1i i i  '2 i  '3 0i
1 1.5325 0.0858 1.0000 0.1359 -0.0040 -3.5753
(0.0308) (0.0052) - (0.0059) (0.0002) (0.0363)
2 1.5664 0.0879 0.3085 0.0419 -0.0012 -2.1070
(0.0153) (0.0050) (0.0409) (0.0213)
3 1.3699 0.0486 0.1958 0.0266 -0.0008 -1.5369
(0.0132) (0.0032) (0.0464) (0.0218)
4 1.8741 0.0595 0.2661 0.0362 -0.0011 -3.7817
(0.0321) 0.0040) (0.0474) (0.0296)
5 1.2028 0.0764 1.0866 0.1477 -0.0043 -3.4752
(0.0401) 0.0037) (0.0472) (0.0286)
6 1.5551 0.0629 0.1453 0.0197 -0.0006 -3.6752
(0.0206) (0.0041) (0.0447) (0.0369)
7 1.3622 0.0265 0.9602 0.1305 -0.0038 -3.4810
(0.0260) (0.0028) (0.0488) (0.0464)
8 1.2539 0.0400 0.3417 0.0464 -0.0014 -3.3763
(0.0156) (0.0031) (0.0352) (0.0400)
ave. 1.4190 0.0576 0.6347 0.0863 -0.0025 -3.2559
S.d. 0.1810 0.0218 0.3878 0.0527 0.0016 0.6623
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Note: .The estimates of the log inverse employment rate equation are -
0.0623 (education), -0.0145 (experience) and 0.0001 (experience squared).
The interruption probability is around 7% per year and the log likelihood is
-13.7347.
Table 2B
The Utility of Attending School
30
Param. (st. error)
grade level Spline Type Intercept
 (:) ()
grade 7-9 0.0164- Type 1 -1.1296
(0.0080) (0.0540)
grade 10 0.3665- Type 2 -1.7791
(0.0142) (0.0922)
grade. 11 -1.0540- Type 3 -1.4172
(0.0203) (0.0384)
grade 12 1.0894 Type 4 -0.8234
(0.0165) (0.0550)
grade 13 -0.5309 Type 5 -1.2595
(0.0165) (0.0487)
grade 14 0.5049 Type 6 -1.1255
(0.0159) ( 0.0424)
grade 15 -0.8824 Type 7 -0.6397
(0.0196) (0.0326)
grade 16 0.9443 Type 8 -0.9934
(0.0242) (0.0548)
grade 17- -0.8023 -
(0.0223)
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Table 3
Absolute and Comparative Advantages: Type Specic Rankings
Rankings
Schooling Labor Market
Wages Employment
Predicted inter. Intercept return to return to intercept
Schooling (abs. adv.) Education Experience term
 w '1  0
type 1 5 5 4 2 2 3
type 2 7 8 2 1 5 7
type 3 1 7 5 6 7 8
type 4 8 2 1 4 6 1
type 5 3 6 8 3 1 5
type 6 4 4 3 5 8 2
type 7 6 1 6 8 3 4
type 8 2 3 7 7 4 6
Note: To compute the average return to experience, we used the return at 8
years of experience.
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Table 4
Correlations between various heterogeneity components
Correlations
wage returns to returns to taste for
intercept schooling experience schooling
wage 1.000 0.2553 -0.4098 0.0272
intercept
returns - 1.0000 0.1030 0.7175
to schooling
returns to - - 1.000 0.2882
experience
taste for - - - 1.000
schooling
Note: All correlations are signicant at the 1% level.
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Table 5A
Estimates of the E¤ects of Labor Market Skills
and Taste for Schooling on Schooling Attainments
Parameter
(st. error)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
intercept 4.6112 3.0602 1.9745 2.4369 2.1898
(0.0844) (0.0254) (0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0030)
wi -0.4317 -0.2286 - -
(0.0630) (0.0337)
(wi )
2 -0.1611 -0.0726 - -
(0.0173) (0.0113)
'1i  100 0.1096 0.0065 - -0.0049 0.0978
(0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0012)
('1i  100)2 -0.0091
(0.0001)
i -0.3422 -0.1130 - -
(0.0029) (0.0002)
0i 0.2344 0.0395 - -
(0.0016) (0.0007)
i 0.7743 - -0.7035 -
(0.0214) (0.0069)
(i )
2 -0.0569 - -0.2582 -
(0.0031) (0.0031)
R2 0.3452 0.2821 0.0929 0.0042 0.0464
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Note: The regressions are performed on 200,000 simulated observations.
The dependent variable is log schooling and, for convenience, the returns
to schooling and experience are multiplied by 100. Similar results may be
obtained using schooling (instead of log schooling).
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Table 5B
Average Returns to Schooling by Grade Level Achieved
Grade level Average Returns St. Deviation
6 0.0464 0.0164
7 0.0473 0.0180
8 0.0489 0.0202
9 0.0534 0.0230
10 0.0609 0.0239
11 0.0607 0.0225
12 0.0592 0.0211
13 0.0547 0.0189
14 0.0502 0.0160
15 0.0461 0.0102
16 0.0445 0.0059
17 0.0443 0.0048
18 0.0442 0.0045
19 0.0423 0.0040
Note: The average returns are based on 200,000 simulated observations.
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Table 6A
A Type Specic Analysis of the E¤ects of a
Counterfactual College Attendance Subsidy
 in Schooling  in Schooling returns to Pred. schooling
(per type) (ranking) schooling
Type 1 1.7 years 7 0.0858 10.8 years
Type 2 3.0 years 3 0.0879 10.4 years
Type 3 2.8 year 5 0.0486 13.7 years
Type 4 1.4 years 8 0.0595 9.4 years
Type 5 3.3 years 2 0.0764 11.5 years
Type 6 2.5 years 6 0.0629 10.9 years
Type 7 2.9 years 4 0.0265 10.6 years
Type 8 3.16 years 1 0.0400 12.6 years
average 2.7 years - 0.0576 11.8 years
(st. dev) (2.2) (0.0218)
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Table 6B
A Type Specic Analysis of the E¤ects of a
counterfactual change in the discount rate
 in Schooling  in Schooling returns to Pred. Schooling
(per type) (ranking) schooling
Type 1 2.1 years 2 0.0858 10.8 years
Type 2 0.7 years 8 0.0879 10.4 years
Type 3 1.31 year 6 0.0486 13.7 years
Type 4 1.0 years 7 0.0595 9.4 years
Type 5 2.6 years 1 0.0764 11.5 years
Type 6 1.4 years 5 0.0629 10.9 years
Type 7 1.9 years 3 0.0265 10.6 years
Type 8 1.4 years 4 0.0400 12.6 years
average 1.7 years - 0.0576 11.8 years
(st. dev) (2.3) (0.0218)
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Table 6C
A Type Specic Analysis of the E¤ects of a
High School Graduation Subsidy
 in Schooling  in Schooling returns to Pred. Schooling
(per type) (ranking) schooling
Type 1 0.0 years 8 0.0858 10.8 years
Type 2 1.3 years 6 0.0879 10.4 years
Type 3 1.7 year 3 0.0486 13.7 years
Type 4 0.0 years 7 0.0595 9.4 years
Type 5 1.9 years 2 0.0764 11.5 years
Type 6 1.4 years 5 0.0629 10.9 years
Type 7 1.5 years 4 0.0265 10.6 years
Type 8 1.4 years 1 0.0400 12.6 years
average 1.33 years - 0.0576 11.8 years
(st. dev) (2.2) (0.0218)
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Table 6D
The determinants of the individual specic reactions
to a college attendance subsidy and a change in discount rate
Parameter (st. error)
College attendance Decrease in High school
subsidy discount rate graduation subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept -8.2350 3.2170 7.2156 2.6480 -6.6068 0.8667
(0.8536) (0.0420) (0.4835) (0.0450) (0.4425) (0.0422)
wi -0.1135 - -2.2556 - -0.7002 -
(0.3859) (0.1168) (0.1062)
'1i  100 -0.1675 -0.0290 0.3582 -0.4430 -0.3168 0.4069
(0.0405) (0.0025) (0.0361) (0.0180) (0.0329) (0.0166)
('1i  100)2 -0.0542 -0.0070 -0.0069 0.0431 -0.0441 -0.0496
(0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0015)
i 6.8437 - -3.4167 1.3485
(0.0029) (0.2721) (0.2482)
2i -4.3433 3.0235 -0.3044
(0.1656) (0.1790) (0.1633)
0i -1.4679 - 0.3349 -1.4048
(0.0638) (0.0348) (0.0316)
i -6.9336 - 2.3425 -6.6557
(0.1640) (0.1783) (0.1616)
R2 0.0977 0.0125 0.0524 0.0112 0.1307 0.0288
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Table 7A
Estimating the Asymptotic Bias
Estimate (P. Value)
plimW
0
N
plim(^ols   )
Education 6.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01)
Experience 2.09 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01)
Experience2 15.27 0.0013
(0.01) (0.01)
Note: The OLS estimates for education, experience and experience2 will
uctuate according to the specic cross-section (year) chosen. The OLS
estimate for education will typically lie between 8% and 10% per year while
the returns to experience will be between 3% and 6% per year.
Table 7B
Correlation Matrix of W266664
educ exp er exp er2
educ 1:0000  0:5158  0:5288
exp er   1:0000 0:9553
exp er2     1:0000
377775
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Appendix 1
The Data
The sample used in the analysis is extracted from the 1979 youth cohort
of the The National Longitudinal Survey of Y outh (NLSY). The NLSY is
a nationally representative sample of 12,686 Americans who were 14-21 years
old as of January 1, 1979. After the initial survey, re-interviews have been
conducted in each subsequent year until 1996. In this paper, we restrict our
sample to white males who were age 20 or less as of January 1, 1979. We
record information on education, wages and on employment rates for each
individual from the time the individual is age 16 up to December 31, 1990.
The original sample contained 3,790 white males. However, we lacked in-
formation on family background variables (such as family income as of 1978
and parentseducation). We lost about 17% of the sample due to missing
information regarding family income and about 6% due to missing informa-
tion regarding parents education. The age limit and missing information
regarding actual work experience further reduced the sample to 1,710.
Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation can be found
in Table 1. The education length variable is the reported highest grade com-
pleted as of May 1 of the survey year and individuals are also asked if they
are currently enrolled in school or not.24 This question allows us to identify
those individuals who are still acquiring schooling and therefore to take into
account that education length is right-censored for some individuals. It also
helps us to identify those individuals who have interrupted schooling. Over-
all, the majority of young individuals acquire education without interruption.
The low incidence of interruptions (Table 1) explains the low average number
of interruptions per individual (0.22) and the very low average interruption
duration (0.43 year) . In our sample, only 306 individuals have experienced
at least one interruption. This represents only 18% of our sample and it is
along the lines of results reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997).25 Given the
age of the individuals in our sample, we assume that those who have already
started to work full-time by 1990 (94% of our sample), will never return to
school beyond 1990. Finally, one notes that the number of interruptions is
24This feature of the NLSY implies that there is a relatively low level of measurement
error in the education variable.
25Overall, interruptions tend to be quite short. Almost half of the individuals (45 %)
who experienced an interruption, returned to school within one year while 73% returned
within 3 years.
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relatively small.
Unlike many reduced-form studies which use proxies for post-schooling
labor market experience (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin), we use actual labor
market experience. Actual experience accumulated is computed using the
fraction of the year worked by a given individual. The availability of data
on actual employment rates allows use to estimate the employment security
return to schooling.
The average schooling completed (by 1990) is 12.8 years. As described
in Belzil and Hansen (2000), it is clear that the distribution of schooling
attainments is bimodal. There is a large fraction of young individuals who
terminate school after 12 years (high school graduation). The next largest
frequency is at 16 years and corresponds to college graduation. Altogether,
more than half of the sample has obtained either 12 or 16 years of schooling.
As a consequence, one might expect that either the wage return to schooling
or the parental transfers vary substantially with grade level.
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics
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Mean St dev. # of individuals
Family Income/1000 36,904 27.61 1710
fathers educ 11.69 3.47 1710
mothers educ 11.67 2.46 1710
# of siblings 3.18 2.13 1710
prop. raised in urban areas 0.73 - 1710
prop. raised in south 0.27 - 1710
prop in nuclear family 0.79 - 1710
AFQT/10 49.50 28.47 1710
Schooling completed (1990) 12.81 2.58 1710
# of interruptions 0.06 0.51 1710
duration of interruptions (year) 0.43 1.39 1710
wage 1979 (hour) 7.36 2.43 217
wage 1980 (hour) 7.17 2.74 422
wage 1981 (hour) 7.18 2.75 598
wage 1982 (hour) 7.43 3.17 819
wage 1983 (hour) 7.35 3.21 947
wage 1984 (hour) 7.66 3.60 1071
wage 1985 (hour) 8.08 3.54 1060
wage 1986 (hour) 8.75 3.87 1097
wage 1987 (hour) 9.64 4.44 1147
wage 1988 (hour) 10.32 4.89 1215
wage 1989 (hour) 10.47 4.97 1232
wage 1990 (hour) 10.99 5.23 1230
Experience 1990 (years) 8.05 11.55 1230
Note: Family income and hourly wages are reported in 1990 dollars.
Family income is measured as of May 1978. The increasing number of wage
observations is explained by the increase in participation rates.
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